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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 
THE IMPACT OF SCOTTISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
ON LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Keith Hayton, Centre for Planning, 
University of Strathclyde 
If the timetable set out by The Scottish Office in its 
recent Consultation Paper, "Shaping The New Councils" 
(The Scottish Office, 1992,a), goes according to plan 
there should be a new system of local government in 
Scotland by April 1996. The Paper makes out a case for 
reform based on such factors as a lack of understanding 
of the existing system and the difficulties that residents 
have in identifying with some of the larger authorities. 
It then goes on to outline the principles upon which the 
new system should be based. Despite this attempt at 
objectivity there must be a suspicion, however 
unjustified, that reform will be used to increase the 
power of Central Government at the expense of the local 
authorities. Such suspicion is particularly strong with 
regard to local economic development, a local authority 
activity that has tended to be regarded with some 
ambivalence by Central Government. Accordingly this 
paper will consider the likely impact of the reform 
proposals upon local government's economic 
development role. 
The existing local government system 
The present Scottish local government system is based 
largely upon the recommendations of the Wheatley 
Committee (Royal Commission on Local Government in 
Scotland, 1969). The Committee felt that local 
government had an important role to play in what it 
called "industrial development". This was seen as 
covering a wide spectrum: from research to the direct 
provision of loans. It proposed that a 2-tier structure be 
set up, with both tiers having powers to assist industry. 
Although the split of responsibilities was not detailed the 
expectation was that the upper tier, the regions, would 
be mainly responsible for research and strategic 
decisions upon industrial location. The districts, the 
lower tier, were seen as being more concerned with the 
direct provision of aid to industry. 
Wheatley's recommendations were implemented in 1975, 
although there were some boundary changes and service 
reallocations between the tiers. In mainland Scotland an 
upper tier of 9 regions, with responsibility for the 
majority of services, and a lower tier of 53 districts were 
created. The industrial development service was split 
between the tiers. 
The formation of the regions caused resentment 
particularly from the former cities which lost many of 
their powers. In their evidence to the Stodart 
Committee, which reviewed the workings of the new 
system (Scottish Office, 1981), they argued that they 
should be given all or most-purpose status. The 
Committee recognised that many of the problems with 
the new system would be solved if single tier authorities 
were created. However it felt that the merits of such a 
system needed to be considered on a Scotland-wide basis 
rather than in response to the pressures from individual 
authorities. Accordingly it limited itself to making a 
number of recommendations intended to clarify the 
responsibilities of the 2 tiers. 
For economic development it proposed that the Tegions 
alone should have powers to assist industry. The 
Government's response was contained in the 1982 Local 
Government and Planning (Scotland) Act Rather than 
take away the districts' responsibilities the Act defined 
more clearly the industrial promotion roles of the 2 tiers. 
Essentially the districts were only allowed to become 
involved in general industrial promotional activities 
within their own boundaries or elsewhere if specifically 
invited by a region or other body designated by the 
Secretary of State. 
Economic development has therefore remained a service 
split between the tiers. 
A unitary system 
The Scotland-wide consideration of the merits of a 
single-tier system had to wait for another 10 years. In 
June 1991 the Secretary of State published a 
Consultation Paper on the reform of local government 
(The Scottish Office, 1991). This argued that the 2-tier 
system, despite the implementation of some of Stodart's 
recommendations, was still flawed and that 
circumstances had changed markedly since the 1970s. 
The arguments put forward in favour of reform, of 
relevance to local economic development, were:-
a) duplication and implied waste caused by both 
tiers still having responsibilities for "industrial 
development"; and 
b) the formation of Scottish Enterprise and the 
local enterprise companies (LECs) that, it was 
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claimed, were now "largely" responsible for 
economic development. This was in marked 
contrast to the situation in the 1960s when this 
was seen as being primarily a local authority 
responsibility. 
The Paper strongly argued that the establishment of a 
single tier of unitary authorities would resolve many of 
the problems apparent in the present system and be far 
more relevant to the 1990s. To this end comments were 
invited. The outcome was the publication of a second 
Consultation Paper, "Shaping the New Councils" in 
October 1992 (The Scottish Office, 1992). 
Shaping the new councils 
The emphasis in this Paper is upon how a single tier 
system of local government should operate rather than 
the need for change. To help in this 4 possible unitary 
structures, of 15, 24, 35 and 51 authorities, are 
illustrated. The impacts of each upon the main local 
government services are then considered. Local 
economic development, one assumes following Wheatley, 
is described as "industrial development". The section 
dealing with it acknowledges that local government has 
provided a range of services, both on its own and in 
partnership with others. The statutory basis for such 
provision is described as "broad" and "discretionary". 
This is because economic development is legally 
justified by a variety of statutes including the general 
power contained in Section 83 of the 1973 Local 
Government (Scotland) Act and an assortment of other 
legislation. This is in marked contrast to the situation in 
England and Wales. There local economic development 
was placed upon a statutory footing by the 1989 Local 
Government and Housing Act which, under Section 33, 
gave local authorities a specific, discretionary economic 
development power. 
The Paper suggests that consideration should be given to 
introducing similar legislation in Scotland. The 
justification for this is thai it would help to draw the 
boundaries between the responsibilities of local 
government and other bodies, such as the LECs, "whose 
remit is specifically to encourage local economic 
development". 
The Paper then considers the implications of the 4 
structures upon local government's industrial 
development role. It is argued that the larger authorities, 
set up under the 15 and 24 unit structures, would be 
more capable of providing a cost effective service, 
particularly for such activities as trade promotion and 
sites and premises. They would find it easier to take an 
objective and strategic view of the industrial needs of 
their area. Their size would also mean that they would 
find it easier "to relate to and work alongside the 
network of Local Enterprise Companies". In contrast the 
35 and 51 authority structures, it is claimed, are likely to 
be more responsive to the needs of small business and 
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may find it easier to work with the enterprise trusts. 
For all 4 structures it is acknowledged that not all 
authorities may want to be involved in industrial 
development Li the structures with the greater number of 
authorities it is also argued that some will lack the 
resources to become involved in particular activities, for 
example trade promotion. It is suggested that this might 
require joint working or the development of agency 
arrangements. Either option would seem to do little to 
avoid the confusion that is said to be a "serious 
weakness" of the present system. 
The validity of the case for reform 
There may be a strong case for reforming Scottish local 
government. However the arguments put forward for 
reform seem weak when industrial development is 
considered. A particular concern is duplication. 
Undoubtedly authorities in different tiers in some areas 
provide similar services. To then argue that this 
amounts to duplication that needs to be solved by 
removing one of the tiers is to ignore the size of the 
market and its many different needs. Districts and 
regions provide similar services not because they want 
to compete with one another and cause confusion but 
because they are responding to the demands of a very 
large and diverse market 
Arguments for reform based upon the existence of the 
LECs are equally dubious. Obviously the LECs exist. 
To then argue that this justifies less local authority 
involvement in economic development is to again ignore 
the realities of the Scottish economy. On a range of 
indicators, in particular business start-ups, Scotland lags 
behind many other regions in the United Kingdom. The 
need is for more economic development services to be 
provided by a diversity of agencies rather than for the 
LECs to become the sole providers. 
The validity of the arguments put forward for reform, 
when applied to economic development, seem to be 
based more on a desire for administrative tidiness than 
upon any realistic appraisal of the needs of the economy 
or of the clients. Despite this the establishment of a 
single tier structure seems almost certain to go ahead. 
What will be the impact upon local government's 
economic development service? 
The impact upon local government 
One of the more ominous parts of the Paper is the 
consideration being given to defining local government's 
economic development role in statute. As the 
justification for this is to clarify the responsibilities of 
the "publicly-funded organisations which are active in 
this field" it then seems likely that any statute will 
define local government's economic remit very 
specifically, taking account of the activities of the LECs. 
The implication is that any activities that are not so 
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defined will be "ultra vires" so that local government 
cannot, legally, be involved in providing them. As the 
LECs are mainly involved in training and business 
development local government may be forced to 
withdraw from these areas, or may only have a role if 
specifically mvited by a LEC. Under the guise of 
avoiding duplication the danger is that in many areas the 
LECs will determine the economic development services 
that are provided and who they are provided to. It has 
already been argued that the LECs are increasingly 
determining exactly what the enterprise mists do (Hayton, 
forthcoming). Unfortunately the same thing may happen 
to local government as one of the by-products of reform. 
It may be that this interpretation of the introduction of an 
economic development power is too pessimistic. For 
example the specific economic development power in 
England has not proved to be restrictive. However to 
assume that there will be a similar outcome in Scotland 
is to forget that the Training and Enterprise Councils 
(TECs) are not the same as the LECs. The TECs provide 
a more limited range of services which tend to 
complement those that local government provides. In 
Scotland there is more of an apparent overlap between 
local government's economic development activities and 
those of the LECs. It will therefore be far easier to 
justify restrictive legislation on the grounds that 
duplication and waste are being eliminated. Comparisons 
with the situation in England must therefore be treated 
with some caution. 
There may also be less money spent on economic 
development if the reforms go ahead. In 1990/91 
McQuaid (1992) estimated that gross revenue and capital 
spending on economic development by Scottish 
authorities was £90.6 million. The region and islands 
councils accounted for 59% of this. Of the regions 
Strathclyde had a gross expenditure of £10.9 million; 
12% of all spending by Scottish authorities. Strathclyde 
disappears in all of the 4 illustrative local authority 
structures. Indeed the abolition of Strathclyde seems to 
be one of the unwritten aims of the reform. Expenditure 
on economic development is discretionary and seems set 
to remain so even if local government's role is defined 
more clearly in statute. Regardless of the state of the 
national economy in 1996 it seems unlikely that the new 
authorities will be generously funded, especially given 
the concerns over the costs of reorganisation. No doubt 
savings will be looked for and discretionary expenditure 
such as upon economic development seems to be an 
ideal target. The threatened introduction of specific 
legislation outlining local government's economic 
development role could be a way for The Scottish Office 
to ensure that such savings are made by restricting local 
government's economic development activities. Many 
of Strathclyde's economic development activities could 
disappear as a result. 
That Strathclyde's services seem threatened is beyond 
doubt. The impact upon the services provided by the 
other regions is harder to predict. However all disappear 
under the 35 and 51 unit structures, whilst only 3 
survive under the 24 authority structure. Given that it is 
unlikely that the unitary authorities will be willing or 
able to fund the activities presently supported by the 
regions it seems that even on a reasonably optimistic 
assumption a large proportion of the regions' current 
spending on economic development must be under threat. 
Nor is it likely that the LECs will be allowed to increase 
their spending to compensate for the loss of the Region's 
services. Indeed rumours are that Scottish Enterprise's 
budget will be cut back in 1993-94. 
Unitary status may also have an adverse impact upon the 
many partnerships that local government is involved in. 
McQuaid (1992) outlines many of these. Here the threat 
to two, the enterprise trusts and community business 
support units, will be considered. According to Scottish 
Business in the Community (SBC) in 1991/92 support, 
in cash and kind, to the trusts from local government 
amounted to £1.765 million, almost 16% of the trusts' 
total income. The regions contributed 45% of this. The 
largest contribution came from Strathclyde which 
accounted for 51% of regional spending on the trusts and 
23% of all local authority expenditure. SBC estimates 
that the demise of the regions could deprive the trusts of 
between 10% and 13% of their income. One consequence 
will be for the trusts to become even more dependent 
upon funding from the local enterprise companies than 
they already are (Hayton, forthcoming), thereby further 
undermining their independence. The survival of 
community business support units, certainly in dieir 
present form, must also be in doubt under a unitary 
system. McQuaid (1992) estimates that total local 
authority spending on the units in 1990/91 was over £1 
million. Again Srrathclyde Region was one of the main 
funders, contributing £0.4 million to Community 
Investment Strathclyde, almost 20% of its annual 
income. To date most of the LECs have shown a marked 
reluctance to fund community business. Given this, it is 
likely that reform will result in a significant decrease in 
public support. A similarly pessimistic scenario can be 
developed for many other partnership initiatives, 
including support for co-operatives and a range of 
voluntary sector projects targeted at vulnerable groups 
and areas. 
The loss or reduction of the regions' spending on 
economic development will mean that there will be less 
leverage. For example, although Strathclyde had a gross 
expenditure of £10.9 million on economic development 
in 1991/92, some £2.4 million of this was provided by 
the European Social Fund (ESF) to support a range of 
training and employment subsidy schemes. Other regions 
make use of ESF finance. If the regions' probable demise 
means that there is less money to spend on local 
economic development then it will become harder to 
raise the matching finance necessary to obtain ESF 
support. The loss of money for local economic 
development may therefore be even greater than at first 
sight 
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Conclusion 
Regardless of the validity of the case for establishing 
unitary authorities, by 1996 Scotland is likely to have a 
unitary local government system. Local economic 
development is not a major local authority service, 
accounting for around 8% of current expenditure in 
1991/92. It is however of greater significance than this 
relatively modest percentage implies for 4 reasons:-
a) it results in direct job creation at a rime when 
Central Government policy seems to be having 
the reverse effect and when, in many services, 
local government is being reduced to the role 
of an enabler rather than that of a direct 
provider; 
b) much of local government's activity is targeted 
at vulnerable groups and areas which are often 
neglected by other organisations; 
c) local economic development is often used to 
reinforce other local authority initiatives aimed 
at social and urban regeneration. Without it the 
success of these will be undermined; and 
d) it is one of the few areas where there is still 
scope for local government innovation and 
initiative largely as economic development is 
not tightly defined by statute and 
accompanying regulations. 
These factors are important in their own right. 
Underlying them is the political significance of local 
economic development. Central Government seems to be 
indifferent to the fate of the unemployed. Local 
economic development is a way for local politicians to 
show they care and are attempting to do something and 
indeed can do something, albeit in a modest way, to 
tackle the problem. Economic development is also one 
of the few areas where it is still possible to formulate 
and implement policies to meet specific locally 
determined priorities: one of the few areas of local 
government rather than the local administration of 
centrally determined policies. For this reason, if for 
nothing else, the fate of local economic development in 
a reformed local government system is of far greater 
significance than its modest share of expenditure would 
indicate. 
come to have a near monopoly in the provision of 
publicly funded economic development services. The 
consequences will be less economic development 
activity, the denial of support to certain groups and 
activities as the LECs try to target "winners" and the loss 
of the local authorities' ability to develop innovative 
projects to fill market gaps. Underlying all of this is the 
fact that the LECs, although publicly funded, are private 
companies which are not democratically accountable in 
anything like the same way that local government is. 
Reform will therefore mark an acceleration of the trend 
towards back door privatisation and the increasing 
centralisation of power. Paradoxically this will be done 
under the guise of making local government more 
accountable. 
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At this stage the impact of the reform proposals on 
economic development must be speculative. However 
what seems to be indicated is a shift in the balance from 
local government to the LECs. This will come about not 
by the LECs expanding their role but by local 
government's role decreasing. The decrease will be 
brought about by the unwillingness or the inability of the 
unitary authorities to fund the services presently provided 
by the regions and by the use of statute to restrict local 
government's involvement to those activities which are of 
litde interest to the LECs. As a result the LECs will 
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